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Ross and Olivecrona on Rights
BRIAN H. BIX1
Introduction
The Scandinavian legal realists, critically-inclined theorists from Denmark,
Norway, and Sweden, who wrote in the early and middle decades of the 20t
century,2 are not as widely read as they once were in Britain, and they seemed
never to have received much attention in the United States. This is
unfortunate, as the work of those theorists, at their best, is as sharp in its
criticisms and as sophisticated philosophically as anything written by the
better known (at least better known in Britain and the United States) American
legal realists, who were writing at roughly the same time. The focus of the
present article, Alf Ross and Karl Olivecrona, were arguably the most
accessible of the Scandinavian legal realists, with their clear prose, straight-
forward style of argumentation, and the availability of a number of works in
English. Their work continues to repay attention: it is provocative in the best
tradition of 'realist' and critical theory.
This article will examine the theories of Ross and Olivecrona through
the lens of their analyses of legal rights.3 It is perhaps not surprising that both
writers devoted a great deal of attention to legal rights. As Olivecrona pointed
out, legal rights raise the challenge of, on one hand, implying a metaphysics
(ontology) that the Scandinavian legal realists deny, but on the other hand,
being seemingly indispensable to any discussion about law.
4
1 Frederick W. Thomas Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of
Minnesota. I am grateful to Linda R. Meyer, Thomas Morawetz, Stanley L.
Paulson, and an anonymous reviewer, for their comments and suggestions.
2 The most prominent of whom were Axel Hdgerstrm (1868-1939), Vilhelm
Lundstedt (1882-1955), Karl Olivecrona (1897-1980), and Alf Ross (1899-
1979).
3 The focus of this paper is the narrower category of 'legal rights', and while
much of Ross's work is similarly narrowly focused, some of Olivecrona's
analysis could be seen as directed at 'rights' generally (that is, including
moral rights as well).
4 See Karl Olivecrona, 'Legal Language and Reality', in Ralph A. Newman
(ed), Essays in Jurisprudence in Honor of Roscoe Pound (1962) 151-91,
especially 166-69; see also Karl Olivecrona, Law as Fact (2nd ed., 1971)
158-59, 165-67, 184.
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Part I of the article will introduce Ross's approach to legal theory; Part
II will offer an overview of Ross's writings on legal rights; Part III will
summarize Olivecrona's approach; and Part IV evaluates a variety of
criticisms that have been offered, or could be offered, to the approaches of the
two theorists, before concluding.
I. Alf Ross and Avoiding Metaphysics
Ross's approach to jurisprudence was simultaneously simple and
radical: he wanted to rid from our thinking about law all the mystifying
references to abstract concepts and metaphysical entities:
The leading idea of this work is to carry, in the field of
law, the empirical principles to their ultimate conclusions.
From this idea springs the methodological demand that
the study of law must follow the traditional patterns of
observation and verification which animate all modem
empirical science; and the verification demand that the
fundamental legal notions must be interpreted as
conceptions of social reality, the behavior of man in
society, and as nothing else.5
This is the power - and the mystery - of Scandinavian legal realism: its
efforts to translate legal concepts into the stuff of verifiable social sciences.6
For Ross, concepts like 'right', 'validity' and 'obligation' have to be translated
into observable behavior (including perceptions of bindingness, inclinations
for behavior or likelihood of behavior).7 Consider the following example:
5 Alf Ross, On Law and Justice (hereinafter, Ross, OLJ) (1959) ix; see also
Alf Ross, Towards a Realistic Jurisprudence (hereinafter, Ross, Realistic)
(1989) (1946) 10 ('The way to conquer dualism and its unfortunate
consequences is ... to interpret the ideas of a superempirical 'validity' as
rationalisations of certain emotional experiences and thus include them in
the world of facts.').
6 H L A Hart's description of Axel Hagerstrom's work was meant also as an
overview of all of Scandinavian legal realism:
[It] is a sustained effort to show that notions commonly accepted as
essential parts of the structure of law such as rights, duties,
transfers of rights, and validity, are in part composed of
superstitious beliefs, 'myths', 'fictions', 'magic' or rank confusion.
H L A Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (hereinafter, Hart,
Essays) (1983) 161.
7 See, e.g., Ross, OLJ, above n 5, 17-18 (offering an analysis of 'valid law'
that is meant 'to raise doubts as to the necessity of metaphysical
explanations of the concept of law').
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'That A is "bound" to perform a certain action F, then only means that the
opposite behavior, non-F, is one of the conditions determining the expected
occurrence of a reaction of compulsion against A.' 8
The argument is not merely that one should generally avoid interpreting
the world (legal and otherwise) in a way that required the existence of
additional metaphysical entities - a kind of 'Ockham's razor.' 9 The point -
and this has been noted by many legal commentators10 - is that the ontology of
law is doubly strange: law seems to use conventional normative language,
about what 'should' or 'should not' be done, but simultaneously holds itself
separate from conventional normative discourse - thus, one can say that
'according to law, I ought to do X', and, at the same time, assert that 'morally
[or prudentially or all things considered] I ought not to do X'. All of modem
legal positivism (especially the works of Hans Kelsen, H.L.A. Hart, and
Joseph Raz) can be seen as attempts to create a way of talking about the
normative discourse of law without, on one hand, reducing it to purely
empirical terms, but also without, on the other hand, treating law (as some
natural law theories do) as merely a subset of morality.11 However, Ross
rejected creating a whole new normative universe for legal discourse. 12
There was a similar demystifying element to some of those who worked
in the American version of legal realism. 13 However, while on the American
Ross, Realistic, above n 5, 176. One should note the similarity of Ross's
analysis of rules (here discussing not legal rules, but the rules of chess):
'The rules of chess have no reality and do not exist apart from the
experience of the players, that is, their ideas of certain patterns of behaviour
and, associated therewith, the emotional experience of the compulsion to
obey.' Ross, OLJ, above n 5, 16. (Ross makes it clear that he means a
similar analysis to apply to legal rules. Id, 17-18.)
9 This is the principle of parsimony, associated with William Ockham
[sometimes spelled as 'Occam'] (c. 1285-1347), which holds that 'entities
should not be multiplied beyond necessity' in the construction of theories,
Robert Audi (ed), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (2 nd ed., 1999)
629.
10 See, e.g., Hans Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory (1992)
8-14; Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (1990) 170-77.
11 Joseph Raz, 'On the Nature of Law' (Kobe lectures of 1994), Archiv far
Rechts- undSozialphilosophie, 82 (1996): 1-25, at 16 & n.16.
12 See Ross, OLJ, above n 5, x: 'I reject the idea that legal cognition
constitutes a specific normative cognition, expressed in ought-propositions,
and interpret legal thinking formally in terms of the same logic as that on
which other empirical sciences are based (is-propositions).' It is important
to note that Ross thought 'metaphysical speculation' to be equally 'empt[y]'
in law and morality.
13 The best example probably being Felix Cohen, 'Transcendental Nonsense
and the Functional Approach', (1935) 35 Columbia Law Review 809-49.
106 (2009) 34 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy
side the demystification often involved remaking strange legal concepts in
more familiar forms, the work of the Scandinavian legal realists often seemed
to have the opposite effect, making the familiar seem strange. Such was the
case with the analyses of legal rights one finds in both Ross and Olivecrona. 14
II. The 'Magic' of Rights
If one is bothered by metaphysical terminology in legal analysis C and
Ross and the other Scandinavian realists sometimes took their disaffection
with metaphysics to high levels 15 - nothing might be more irritating than the
way legal commentators talk about 'rights.' Not only do discussions of
'rights' and 'duties' seem to refer to magical entities more frequently
discussed than seen, the references themselves seem to have no internal
coherence, even putting aside the metaphysical/ontological problems. 
16
This looseness of expression regarding rights has provoked other
proposals, some almost as radical as Ross's. 17 The American legal realist
Demystification was also an important objective for the great English
commentator on law and politics, Jeremy Bentham. See H L A Hart, Essays
on Bentham: Jurisprudence and Political Theory (hereinafter, Hart,
Bentham) (1982) 21-39.
14 For Ross, see Ross, OLJ, above n 5, 170-201 (ch. 6: 'The Concept of
Rights'; ch. 7: 'Rights In Rem and Rights In Personam'); see also Ross,
Realistic, above n 5, 175-210; Alf Ross, Directives and Norms (1968) 106-
38. Olivecrona's approach (and the relevant sources in his work) will be
covered in Part III.
15 Consider Hart on Ross's discussion of 'legal validity': '[F]or Ross legal
validity is a dangerously septic notion; unless we handle it carefully,
wearing the protective rubber gloves of an 'empirical methodology'
determined to admit into our stock of notions only hard empirically
verifiable facts, we shall catch the infection of "metaphysics".' Hart,
Essays, above n 6, 164.
16 A. W. B. Simpson suggests that Ross goes wrong because he does not
recognize the connection between legal words and the same words when
used in a non-legal context. A W B Simpson, 'The Analysis of Legal
Concepts' (1964) 80 Law Quarterly Review 535 at 551-3. While this
critique might have bite for legal terms like 'possession', it is far less telling
for 'rights'. If anything, as Jeremy Bentham understood, see n 56 below,
legal rights are more grounded and have less reason to be suspected of being
non-sensical than rights outside the legal context (moral rights, human
rights), because legal rights are connected with descriptions of how certain
institutions have acted or predictions of how they will act.
17 It might be worth noting that there are times when Ross's discussion of
'rights' can be fairly conventional. See, e.g., Ross, OLJ, above n 5, 183-6
(on the 'scope' of rights); id., 189-201 (on in rem vs. in personam rights);
Ross and Olivercrona on Rights 10
Wesley Hohfeld famously offered a set of stipulative defmitions to try to bring
order to the legal discussion of rights. Hohfeld showed that the term 'right', as
used in legal discourse, can be more precisely defined in one of four ways,
each of which has a precise correlate: (1) a 'claim' (or 'right', narrowly
understood) involves a specific entitlement to assistance or non-interference,
to which another party has a correlative 'duty'; (2) a 'liberty' is a freedom
from any duty to avoid such action, and is thus correlated with another party's
'no-right' concerning that action; (3) a 'power' is the ability to modify one's
entitlements, correlating with another party's 'liability' to that modification;
and (4) an 'immunity' is protection from another party's actions, and that other
party can thus be said to have a 'disability' in such matters.
18
A few decades later, H.L.A. Hart (in some of his earliest work) tried to
avoid the apparent metaphysical implications of rights-talk by assuming that
rights-talk could (often) be understood as statements of illocutionary acts. 19
That is, according to this analysis, statements of legal rights were not so much
descriptions of what was the case, but rather conclusions meant to affect future
behavior. 'With this ring I thee wed' is an illocutionary act in this sense: it
does not merely describe a state of events, nor is it meant as a prescription; it is
a statement which by itself has effects, changing a couple's social and legal
status. 20 Similarly, Hart's argument went, a judge's statements that 'X has a
right' or 'Z violated the contract she had with A' should be seen as
declarations that changed the legal status of parties as regards control over
property.
It is important to note that though Ross was critical of the metaphysical
implications of much talk of rights, he dissented from the views of other
Scandinavian legal realists who would excise the term from legal discourse.
21
Ross, Realistic, n 5, 179-88 (on 'will theories' vs 'interest theories' or
rights).
18 Wesley N Hohfeld, 'Some Fundamental Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning' (1913) 23 Yale Law Journal 16; 'Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning', (1917) 26 Yale Law Journal
710.
19 H L A Hart, 'The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights' (1948-49) 17
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 171. Hart was building on the
speech act theory of J.L. Austin, see J L Austin, How to Do Things with
Words (1962), where Austin pointed out that some statements, like 'I now
pronounce you man and wife', were not meant to describe anything in the
world, but to do something. Hart disavowed this approach in his later work.
See, e.g., Hart, Essay, above n 6, 1-2.20 See generally Austin, above n 19.
21 Alf Ross, 'Tfi-tfl' (1957) 70 Harvard Law Review 812 at 817-25
(hereinafter, Ross, Tit-tfi) & n 4; Ross, OLJ, above n 5, 186-88; see
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He thought that concepts like 'right' (or 'ownership') simply were useful
shorthands, 'tools of presentation' for rephrasing the legal consequences of a
22
series of loosely related factual circumstances. A 'legal right', or a particular
kind of 'legal right' is a convergence point: a variety of different factual
predicates (all the ways that one can come to 'own' property or have a
contract-based 'right') will lead to identical, or highly similar, remedial or
punitive consequences (e.g., the ability to recover money damages in court
from those who act in an unauthorized way regarding the property or the
contract). 23 'Sentences in which [the word "right"] occurs can be rewritten
without making use of the term, yet indicating the connection in the directives
of the law between conditioning facts and conditioned consequences.' 
24
Still, Ross was concerned that we not fall into the trap of believing that
'rights' or 'claims' represent some entity, or indeed a magical sort of force:
We ... express ourselves as though something had come
into being between the conditioning fact (juristic fact) and
the conditioned legal consequence, namely, a claim, a
right, which like an intervening vehicle or causal
connecting link promotes an effect or provides the basis
for a legal consequence. Nor, really, can we wholly deny
that this terminology is associated for us with more or less
indefinite ideas that a right is a power of an incorporeal
nature, a kind of inner, invisible dominion over the object
of the right, a power manifested in, but nevertheless
different from, the exercise of force (judgment and
execution) by which the factual and apparent use and
enjoyment of the right is effectuated.25
Olivecrona, Law as Fact, above n 4, 176 (summarizing Vilhelm Lundstedt's
position).
22 See Ross, above n 21, 817-25 & n 4, Ross, OLJ, above n 5, 170-5.
23 Ross, OLJ, above n 5, 174.
24 Ross, OLJ, above n 5, 172-3.
25 Ross, above n 21, 818. For a similar analysis, see Axel Hagerstr6m,
Inquiries into the Nature of Law and Morals (1953) 1-6; Olivecrona, Law as
Fact, above n 4, 183-5. See Hagerstr6m, above, 5-6:
It seems, then, that we mean, both by rights of property
and rightful claims, actual forces, which exist quite
apart from our natural powers; forces which belong to
another world than that of nature, and which legislation
or other forms of law-giving merely liberate. The
authority of the state merely lends its help to carry these
forces, so far as may be, over into reality ... We feel
that here there are mysterious forces in the background
from which we can derive support. Modem
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The temptation to this sort of conclusion is encouraged by the 'grammar' of
rights statements: 'The use of the concept of rights occurs in statements which
do not seem to give an account of rules of law but to be descriptions of pure
facts.' 26 Instead, Ross would have us remember that the statements are at
most factual, within the context of a particular set of legal rules.27
Ross does not claim that the people who first used such terms
necessarily thought that they in fact represented strange entities or forces; Ross
thinks it better (perhaps, in Donald Davidson's terminology, 'more
charitable' 28) to think of concepts like 'rights' and 'ownership' as an intuitive,
'pre-scientific' simplification and rationalization. 29
III. Olivecrona's Approach
Some commentators have argued that Ross and Olivecrona had
distinctly different approaches, but the two approaches seem to converge more
than they diverge.3 ° While it is true that Ross affirmed logical positivism (or
something close too it31) while Olivecrona asserted a vague anti-metaphysical
jurisprudence ... seeks to discover facts corresponding
to these supposed mysterious forces, and it lands in
hopeless difficulties because there are no such facts.
26 Ross, OLJ, above n 5, 173. The later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein also
emphasized how sometimes grammar can mislead us. See, e.g., P M S
Hacker, Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy
(1996) 109 (summarizing Wittgenstein's analysis about the grammatical
similarity but real differences between first-person avowals of pain and
normal descriptive sentences, 'I have a pain' vs. 'I have a pin').
27 Ross, OLJ, above n 5, 15-8, 170-5. This aspect of Ross's analysis seems
similar to that of his teacher Kelsen (id, x). See, e.g., Kelsen, above n 10,
32-35. There are a number of other similarities between Ross's analysis and
that of Kelsen - though many significant differences as well. One such
convergence is in the view of legal rules as primarily directives to judges
authorizing the imposition of sanctions. Compare, Ross, Directives, above n
14, 90-2, with Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (1967) 203.
28 See, e.g., Donald Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (1984)
136-37, 152-53, 196-97, 200-01.
29 Ross, above n 21, 821; Ross, OLJ, above n 5, 172.
30 See, e.g., Jes Bjarup, 'The Philosophy of Scandinavian Legal Realism'
(2005) 18 Ratio Juris 1, at 10.
31 To my knowledge, Ross never directly adopts the label 'logical positivism'
for his own approach, but his comments regarding the need for verification
and scientific method indicates a position at least roughly comparable to that
of the logical positivists. See, e.g., Ross, OLJ, above n 5, 38-50, 64-70.
While Ross's work seems to endorse a kind of logical positivism, it does not
endorse a different kind of reductionism, that of behaviourism. See, e.g.,
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position (associated with Axel Hidgerstr6m32 ), and without affirming logical
positivism as such, the endpoint of the two approaches seems roughly similar:
skepticism of any object or claim that cannot be translated into an empirical
observation or prediction.
While this skepticism about metaphysical-sounding language in law
parallels similar themes in American legal realism, Olivecrona rejected the
American legal realists' effort to translate legal rights into summaries of past
official actions and predictions of future official action.33  The American legal
realists attempted to equate legal rights with certain facts in the world - a
project with which Olivecrona clearly sympathizes - but their conclusions
were, from his perspective, insufficient. Contrary to the American realists,
Olivecrona argued, a legal right does not equate with the state's having
enforced the right-holder's interest, or a guarantee that it would do so if and
when a conflict arises. 34 We speak of rights even when such descriptions or
predictions would not be well grounded.
Olivecrona compared legal rights with money, in the way that legal
rights can operate as central elements in our (legal) life, even without having
an object, just as 'dollar' and 'pound (sterling)' operate as central to our
(economic) life without having any object they describe (at least since the end
of the gold standard).35 And, like H.L.A. Hart, in his earliest works (discussed
above), Olivecrona thought that insight on the nature of legal rights could be
36found by reference to J. L. Austin's idea of 'performative sentences'.
Olivecrona's theoretical end-point regarding legal rights was
emphasizing their psychological effects on other participants in the legal
system. Where there is sufficient regularity in legal practice and social
expectations, the declaration that someone has a legal right (or legal duty)
brings forth in hearers ideas of powers, permissions, and prohibitions; rights
are 'an instrument of social control and social intercourse' 7 even though
Ross, Directives, above n 14, 86-88. As discussed, Olivecrona does not
endorse logical positivism, but a roughly similar position grounded on the
anti-metaphysical theory of Hgerstr6m There is no time here to develop a
full exploration and critique of lgerstr6m's theory.
32 A good summary of the connections between Olivecrona and Hagerstrom is
given in Bjarup, above n 30.
33 Olivecrona, Legal Language and Reality, above n 4, 156-60.
34 Olivecrona, Legal Language and Reality, above n 4, 156-60, 185; see also
Olivecrona, Law as Fact, above n 4, 171-4.
35 Olivecrona, Legal Language and Reality, above n 4, 170-3; see also Karl
Olivecrona, The Problem of the Monetary Unit (1956).
36 Olivecrona, Legal Language and Reality, above n 4, 177-81.
37 Olivecrona, Legal Language and Reality, above n 4, 191.
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there is no objective entity that corresponds to 'legal right' (or 'legal duty'). 38
Under this approach, legal rights serve as 'signs' telling us what to do and
what not to do (e.g., that we can do what we like with the objects we 'own',
but should not interfere with objects that 'belong' to another); legislation
establishes and regularizes the standards by which legal rights are created and
modified; and court decisions, backed up by official means of enforcement,
serve both to effect and reinforce claims and expectations connected with legal
4 '39rights' and 'duties'.
IV. Criticisms
This section will briefly consider some criticisms of the approaches of
Ross and Olivecrona, and some actual and potential responses to those
criticisms.
A. Olivecrona on Ross: Not Skeptical Enough?
Olivecrona argued that Ross's analysis of 'rights' was not really as
skeptical or as critical as it was presented as being, and that Ross's analysis in
fact makes little headway in figuring out the 'real nature' of rights.40 Recall
38 Olivecrona, Legal Language and Reality, above n 4, 177-89; see also
Olivecrona, Law as Fact, above n 4, 183-216.
39 Olivecrona divides the functions of legal rights into their 'directive function'
('signs'), their informative function (how, e.g., being informed that X owns
property A gives us likely information about the relationship of X and A, as
well as what legal procedures will be required should one wish to purchase
A, or rent space in A); and their role in the administration of justice (how
judicial declarations regarding rights necessarily take precedence over any
pre-existing 'truth' regarding those rights). Olivecrona, Law as Fact, above
n 4, 186-216.
40 At the same time, in one of Olivecrona's last works on legal rights, his
discussion seems to echo Ross's views. See Olivecrona, Legal Language
and Reality, above n 4, 189:
Thus the expression 'right or property' serves as a
connecting link between two sets of rules: on the one
hand the rules about the acquisition of property, on the
other hand penal rules and rules about damages, etc.,
which refer to the situation where one person is the
owner of an object and another person does something
with regard to the object.
This certainly sounds like Ross's 'tfi-tMt' analysis, Ross, above n 21, but with
no reference to Ross in sight near the quoted Olivecrona text. In
Olivecrona's defense, one might argue that his analysis of legal rights
extends beyond Ross, adding reference to psychological effects and sign
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that Ross's analysis of rights is that they have no semantic content, but serve
only as 'a tool of presentation' to connect a series of operative facts and a
series of (comparable) legal conclusions involving available remedies. The
difficulty is that the operative facts can often not be described in purely factual
terms, and seem themselves to require the concept of a 'right', or something
comparable. 41 For example, when one offers as an operative fact that leads to
A's 'ownership' of X, that 'A purchased X', 'purchase' already implies
right(s) of ownership (of the seller, and the transfer of such legal rights
through a certain kind of commercial transaction). A different sort of problem
occurs at the other end of the analysis, Olivecrona argues, in connecting
ownership to the ability to recover in court. For example, if someone steals
my wallet, empirically, there may be little chance of a recovery (in most cases
the thief is never found). The claimed connection only makes sense if one
understands the conclusion as a 'right to recover' rather than a factual
likelihood of recovery.42
The challenge can be restated either as one about sufficient care in
presentation - in keeping separate the (relatively) factual from the (relatively)
normative - or as a potentially broader challenge to the ability ever to re-
characterize normative (legal or moral) claims in factual terms. Olivecrona's
challenge was likely intended to raise the first, less ambitious objection, but
the second, broader potential challenge needs to be kept in mind (though its
examination must await another occasion).
B. The Generative Power of Rights
One objection one might have to Ross's view of 'rights', as a mere
'technical tool of presentation', is that it seems in conflict with the practice (in
some legal systems) of 'rights' as an independent basis for creating new (legal)
duties.4 3 The idea of rights as the justification for the creation of new duties
seems to be in conflict with the idea of rights as merely a place-holder
simplifying existing, established legal consequences.
functions to the Rossian analysis of rights as mere shorthand-terms or
connecting links.41 Olivecrona, Law as Fact, above n 4, 179-82.
42 'Ross is not aware of the fact that he simply reverts to the standpoint which
he begins by refuting.' Olivecrona, Law as Fact, above n 4, 181. However,
as discussed in above n 40, Olivecrona's own final position is not that far
from Ross's view.
43 See, e.g., Neil MacCormick, Legal Right and Social Democracy (1982) 154-
66, especially 158-64; Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain (1994) 238-
60, especially 250-53, 258. For an analysis which downplays the challenge
of the MacCormick/Raz position for a Hohfeld (or a Ross) approach to
rights, see Nigel Simmonds, Central Issues in Jurisprudence: Justice, Law
and Rights (2nd ed., 2002) 285-88.
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However, it is not clear how seriously Ross needs to take this objection,
even assuming that it does accurately reflect practice in (some or most) legal
systems. The fact that judges or lawmakers act on the basis of some supposed
entity, does not mean either that the entity exists or that the judges and
lawmakers were wise to act in the way they did or for the reasons they did. It
was an important part of the American legal realist critique that the American
courts were regularly acting on the basis of bad reasons, relating to non-
existent entities - in particular, reified versions of legal concepts. The
argument was that courts would decide cases on the basis of 'the nature of
(reified ideas of) corporations, property, fair value, due process, title, contract,
conspiracy, malice, proximate cause, and so on, when all of these (as
independent entities) were only the imagined creations of the law itself to
begin with.4 4
Ross offers a comparable critique of what he labels the 'hypostasis' 45 of
rights into 'a substance': 'a way of thinking in which "behind" certain
functional correlations a fresh reality is inserted as the "bearer" or cause of
these correlations', in this case 'a tendency ... to look upon a right as an
independent reality distinct from the functions.' 46 Ross continues: 'This
tendency permeates even professional thinking - concealed metaphysical ideas
reveal themselves in false problems, fictions and delusions which can have an
unfortunate influence on the treatment of practical legal questions.' 
4 7
While those who purport to theorize about law should be hesitant to
dismiss an aspect of legal practice, I think it is open to the Ross (and the
American legal realists) to argue that the reasoning used by some judges and
commentators is constructed from flawed foundations.
C. Describing the Practice, and Rule Following
The problem with a social scientific description of rights, one which
tries to reduce that legal concept to predictions about behavior combined with
descriptions of psychological feelings (of compulsion, and the like), is that
such descriptions fail to match the way the terms are actually used in legal
44 See Cohen, above n 13, 809-20. 'Legal arguments couched in these terms
are necessarily circular, since these terms are themselves creations of law,
and such arguments add precisely as much to our knowledge as Moliere's
physician's discovery that opium puts men to sleep because it contains a
dormitive principle.' Id., 820.
45 What most modem writers call a 'reification' (and what Cohen, above n 13,
called a 'thingification').
46 Ross, OLJ, above n 5, 178, 179.
47 Ross, OLJ, above n 5, 179. Ross goes on to discuss confusions relating to
the analysis of third-party beneficiaries, trusts, corporation ownership, and
the like. Id., 179-83.
114 (2009) 34 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy
practice. 48  As Hart has made clear, one response to theorists like Ross and
Olivecrona, who offer unusual analyses of 'rights' because they wish to avoid
undue metaphysics, is to point out that there are 'non-factual, non-predictive
uses of language inseparable from the use of rules.' 4 9 What seem like strange
entities and strange forces may just be an over-reading of the way people talk
who have accepted a standard of behavior, and are using that standard of
behavior as a basis for justifying their own behavior and criticizing the
behavior of others. 50 The language of rule-following may be different from
that of normal descriptive discourse, but that does not mean that it entails
unusual and unwarranted metaphysical assumptions.51
It is not that Ross (or Olivecrona 52 ) does not understand the idea of
equating meaning with rules for use. 53 In his sharp satire on the metaphysics
of law, 'Th-tfi', Ross writes of the (fictional) tribal state of ritual of
uncleanliness, 'th-tfi':
Although the word 'th-th' in itself has no meaning
whatever, yet the pronouncements in which this word
occurs are not made in a haphazard fashion. Like other
pronouncements of assertion they are stimulated in
conformity with the prevailing linguistic customs by quite
48 Hart makes a similar point about Ross's largely-predictive analysis of 'legal
validity'. Hart, Essays, above n 6, 165-6.
49 Hart, Essays, above n 6, 167.
50 See, e.g., H L A Hart, The Concept ofLaw (rev. ed., 1994) 55-60 (discussing
rules, their 'internal aspects', and their difference from habits).
51 See Hart, Essays, above n 6, 13. Hart wrote:
Hagerstr6m's explanation of the phenomenon [that
certain uses of language within the law are anomalous] in
terms of beliefs in 'mystical bonds' and 'the magical'
powers of language to produce changes in a supernatural
world of rights and duties simply abandoned the task of
serious analysis of an important dimension of language,
the use of which is not confined to legal contexts, and led
his followers into a blind alley.
52 Olivecrona makes regularity in the use of 'legal right' central, as a necessary
condition for its having a directive and informative function in society. See
Olivecrona, Law as Fact, above n 4, 186-200. Also, Olivecrona tries to
incorporate Hart's internal point of view within his own more skeptical
analysis. Id., 215-6.
53 See, e.g., Ross, OLJ, above n 5, 175, in which Ross introduces an analysis
regarding 'the conditions under which the concept of rights is applied',
while distinguishing that analysis from 'one of deciding what a right
"actually exists" [because] a "right" does not designate any phenomenon
that exists'.
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definite states of affairs. This explains why the tfi-tfi
pronouncements have semantic reference although the
word is meaningless.54
As Ross indicates, the question remains whether the users of the term
'tfi-tfi' merely equate it with the rules for the term's use - including
descriptions of what has occurred to some individual (she did some 'unclean'
act) or what should be done to that individual (she must undergo ritual
purification) - or whether they think there is an object or force (some state of
uncleanliness) being described.55 Ross does not dissent from the idea that 'it
is possible to talk with meaning about rights, both in the form of prescriptions
and assertions.' 56 However, he simultaneously would assert that a 'right' is a
'word[] without meaning, without any semantic reference'. 5 7
Both Ross and Olivecrona refuse to take the law at its face value. The
discussions of 'legal rights' and 'legal duties' imply that there is something in
the world that makes claims about such rights and duties true or false. Ross
and Olivecrona deny any sense in (i.e., deny any direct referents for) the
normative references in the law, beyond a general correlation between such
references and the subjective psychological feelings of strength or burden in
the individuals who perceive themselves has 'having' these legal rights and
obligations.
54 Ross, Tft-tfi, above n 21, 814. Forty years later, Pierre Schlag offered an
analysis comparable to Ross's 'Tfi-tfi', in which the self-understanding of
law and legal theory was compared with the scientific-sounding nonsense of
phrenology. Pierre Schlag, 'Law and Phrenology', (1997) 110 Harvard Law
Review 877.
55 Ross, above n 21, 814-6.
56 Ross, above n 21, 822. Bentham's view was similar: that the concept of
'legal rights' might have some content, if it could be reduced to talk of real
things C sovereigns and sanctions C but that the concept of 'natural rights'
was nonsense ('nonsense upon stilts', in his memorable phrase) because
they cannot be so reduced. See Jeremy Waldron, Nonsense upon Stilts:
Bentham, Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man (1987) 35-36. On this
point, Bentham's views on natural rights are often considered more radical
for their time than they in fact were. As one commentator notes: 'In fact,
Bentham was, in this regard, firmly in a long tradition of voluntarist natural
lawyers with a deep-seated suspiciousness of rights considered as ultimate
or inalienable.' Knud Haakonssen, 'Protestant Natural Law Theory: A
General Interpretation', in Natalie Brender & Larry Krasnoff (eds), New
Essays on the History ofAutonomy (2004) 92-109, at 105.
57 Ross, above n 21, 821. As Simpson points out, Ross is neither as precise
nor as consistent as he might be when speaking about 't-t' as having no
semantic reference. Simpson, above n 16, 536-42.
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It is important to note that one need not be a skeptic about legal
normative facts to perceive difficulty in the question of the grounds of legal
truth. As some other commentators have pointed out, it is difficult to speak
about the truth of legal propositions, because law itself has different aspects,
which are often in tension: law as a series of historical official actions, and the
efforts of judges and commentators to impose coherence and structure on
those decisions, and law as a process of dispute resolution, a process that may
require or result in the (intended or unintended) modification of existing rules.
One path some legal theorists have taken to try to explain (legal)
normativity without recourse to metaphysical entities is by reference to
practical reasoning. Picking up a theme from the previous line of criticism
discussed (the generative power of rights) and using the terminology of Joseph
Raz, legal rights give reasons for action.58  This can still build off Ross's
analytical point that 'rights' can be seen as a shorthand, as long as rights are
seen, not as a shorthand for the empirical (what is or what has occurred) or the
predictive (what judges will do), but rather for the normative (what citizens
and/or judges have a reason to do). In this sense, talk of rights perhaps needs
not entail reference to strange metaphysical entities or forces. A (legal) duty is
a reason to act consistent as the duty requires. A (legal) right creates reasons
for action for the person who holds the corresponding duty, or for the judge or
other legal official who is in charge of enforcing that right. One can have
reasons for action without any complex metaphysical entity creating or
mediating those reasons. One's being hungry is a reason for eating; one's
wanting a good job is a reason to get an advanced degree; and so on.
58 See Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain, above n 43. On Raz's 'reasons for
action' practical reasoning analysis, especially in application to law, see
Raz, Practical Reason and Norms, above n 10. Raz has recently suggested
that the concept of rights has changed over time:
Because legal theory attempts to capture the essential
features of law, as encapsulated in the self-
understanding of a culture, it has a built-in
obsolescence, since the self-understanding of cultures is
forever changing. A clear example of such a change
occurred over the last half century in the English-
speaking cultures regarding rights. The notion of a right
changed from designating concrete enforceable
entitlements to designating any normally sufficient
ground for a judgement about what ought to happen,
even when there is no one who ought to bring it about,
provided it is based on the interest of an individual
human being or another animal or group.
Raz, above n 11, 6.
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However, 'reasons for action' may merely push the analysis back one
step. It may be relatively straight-forward to state that one's hunger gives one
a reason for action, but another matter to state that a legal right or legal duty
gives one a reason for action. For the legal realist (Scandinavian or American)
can still ask about the nature, or reality, of that reason-giving entity, the (legal)
right or duty. So it may be that practical reasoning analysis may not offer us
any easy way of circumventing the objections the realists raise.
D. Against Logical Positivism
One could also criticize Ross at a more general level, responding to his
basic approach to law, which can be seen as a kind of logical positivism.
'Logical positivism' is the set of ideas and attitudes associated with the
'Vienna Circle', a group of philosophers from the early decades of the 2 0 th
century, which included Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carap, Friedrich Waismann,
and Otto Neurath. The most prominent position of these theorists was that
statements had no meaning unless they were verifiable or falsifiable by
experience (thus, challenging the sense of, among other things, metaphysical
claims), and that the meaning of a proposition was to be equated with its mode
of verification. 9
The argument is that this approach - both in general, and in Ross's
instantiation of it - goes too far, and that in the effort to avoid a world with too
many (or too many strange) entities, he offered a picture of the world in which
there are too few entities. This is not the place to rehearse in detail the
weaknesses of logical positivism (or the weaknesses of the alternatives to
59 See, e.g., David Pears & Anthony Kenny, 'Mill to Wittgenstein', in Anthony
Kenny (ed), The Oxford History of Western Philosophy (1994) 239-74, at
262.
60 Here is one commentator's quick overview:
Logical positivism retreated under a combination of
pressures. First, it shared the traditional problems of
radical empiricism, of satisfactorily describing the basis
of knowledge in experience. Secondly, it depended on
there being one logic for science, or in other words a
confirmation theory with a unique authority, yet no
such structure, and certainly no basis for its authority,
ever forthcame. These two problems bedevilled
accurate formulation of the verification principle, and
gradually persuaded philosophers of science that a more
holistic and less formal relationship existed between
theoretical sentences and the observations supporting
them. When this relationship was allowed to be
indirect, the despised theses of metaphysics began to
look capable of climbing back into respectability.
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logical positivism) or the relative merits of various realist and anti-realist
theories C a conversation that could and does take up whole books and whole
philosophy courses without coming to a final resolution. Suffice it to say that
Ross is too quick in dismissing 'rights' from his world. There are many terms
that refer, without referring to simple physical objects. We want to speak of
the reality of 'rights' much as we want to speak of the reality of 'intentions' or
numbers, two other categories without clear sensible objects.6 1
To be sure, the better analogy for 'rights' is probably not numbers, but
rather ethical properties, in part because 'rights' are part of moral discourse, as
well as legal discourse, but more importantly because 'rights', like moral
62 63properties, seem to supervene on descriptive properties, a point Ross's
own analysis emphasizes. However, it is far from clear that we want to give
up all moral evaluation and metaphysical speculation unless and until we have
a more persuasive set of reasons than the Vienna Circle was able to formulate.
One can come to a similar conclusion from the opposite direction. If
the problem with 'rights' derives from its not being sufficiently 'factual', its
being, like 'tfh-tfi'just the product of a normative system, one might respond
that there is little that is not similarly, in some sense, such a product.64 This
sort of argument is sometimes made in terms of Wittgensteinian rule-
Simon Blackburn, The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (2 nd ed., 2005) 215
(cross-references omitted).
61 The questions about ontology, about what entities 'exist', often formulated
as debates between 'realism' and 'anti-realism', covers not only mental
states and events, but also universals, numbers, legal concepts and moral
properties, the past, and the future. On the realism/anti-realism debate, see,
e.g., Michael Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas (1978) 145-65. For a
discussion in the context of moral and legal concepts, see Michael S. Moore,
'Moral Reality Revisited', (1992) 90 Michigan Law Review 2424.
62 Supervenience indicates a strong connection between properties of one kind
and properties of another. The connection is sufficiently strong that 'if one
thing possess the underlying properties and is F, then any other thing with
the same underlying properties must share the resultant property F', but the
connection falls short (somehow) of the reduction of one set of properties to
the other. Blackburn, above n 60, 356.
63 Intentions, and other mental states, could be said to supervene on physical
states (the underlying biochemistry of the brain), but since such biochemical
facts are not easily accessible to us, were we to stop talking of intentions, it
would be very difficult to substitute physical descriptions in their place. The
replacement of rights talk or moral discourse with descriptive discourse
would inevitably be awkward, but it might be feasible.
64 Simpson seems to be hinting at a similar point in Simpson, above n 16, 542-
5, but the discussion goes off in a quite different direction from there.
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following and forms of life,65 sometimes in terms of Nietzschean metaphors,66
and sometimes in terms of 'social construction'. 67 In general, the point is that
much of what passes for descriptive language is already in part the product of
theory, so efforts to distinguish ('good', 'reliable') empirical matter from
('bad', 'misleading') abstract, theoretical, or metaphysical matter may be
impractical.
It could be that it is counter-productive for moral, legal, and social
theorists to become too concerned about ontology. Perhaps Ronald Dworkin
and Stanley Fish go too far when they advise theorists to forego ontological
theories entirely, 68 but the basic advice to focus primarily on understanding
actual practices, preferably from an 'internal perspective', is probably wise.
Conclusion
I think our jurisprudential discourse is poorer for the present scarcity of
sharp skeptical writers like Alf Ross and Karl Olivecrona, 69 and it is also
poorer for the relative inattention (at least by English-language commentators)
to their work. Writers like Ross and Olivecrona remind us to be wary when
throwing about abstract entities as though they were ordinary physical objects
- or, as though they were extraordinary supernatural forces. They bring to our
attention that the apparently simple question, 'what is a (legal) right?', actually
raises some quite difficult issues.
At the same time, I think we can also learn from the way that Ross's
and Olivecrona's critiques fall short. The inability of their analysis to come to
terms with the language we use in following rules is, in the end, a basis for
criticizing the analysis, not a basis for criticizing normative language. While
we should avoid the temptation of seeing '(legal) rights' as strange objects or
strange forces, rights can, and usually do, play a role within a normative
discourse regarding (legal, or moral) reasons for action.
65 One finds quite different versions of this Wittgensteinian approach in Peter
Winch and Stanley Fish. See, e.g., Peter Winch, The Idea of Social Science
and its Relation to Philosophy (1958); Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes
Naturally (1989).
66 Friedrich Nietzsche, 'On the Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense', in D
Breazeale (ed & fran), Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche's
Notebooks of the Early 1870's (1979) 79-97.67 See, e.g., John R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (1995).
68 See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, 'Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe
It', (1996) 25 Philosophy & PublicAffairs 87; Fish, above n 65, 356-98.69 Or Jeremy Bentham, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Felix Cohen, and Arthur
Leff, just to name four others.
